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Abstract: The striking difference in the outcomes in two transfer tax
cases involving similar circumstances raises au important question: what
role, if any, should judicial doctrines play in resolving transfer tax
controversies? This Article traces the development of judicial doctrines
in the sphere of income tax controversies and discusses the role these
doctrines have played, and should play, in resolving transfer tax
controversies. It concludes that judicial doctrines should serve only a
limited role in resolving transfer tax controversies, and that this limited
role should be taken into account by the Internal Revenue Service
when it enforces compliance, by taxpayers when they plan their estates,
and by Congress when it crafts transfer tax legislation.
INTRODUCTION
The circumstances surrounding the deaths of Mrs. Murphy and
Mrs. Church bear such remarkable similarities that one would assume
that their tax plights would share a common destiny. Each was
wealthy, each had expert legal counsel, and each died within days of
utilizing a similar estate planning technique. This technique—the use
of valuation discounts to minimize asset values—was employed to save
the estates of both Mrs. Murphy and Mrs. Church several hundred
thousand dollars in gift and estate taxes.
Given these similarities, the Internal Revenue Service ("Service")
likely thought that its challenge' to the valuation discounts employed
by the respective estates would yield the same judicial outcome. Yet, in
Estate of Murphy, the Tax Court ruled in favor of the Service,' while in
Estate of Church, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
* jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers University School of Management. He wishes to
thank Professor Charles Davenport, for sowing the intellectual seeds that led to this paper,
and his wife, Amy H. Soled, who supported him through the trials and tribulations of his
tenure quest.
60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645, 664 (1990).
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Texas ruled in favor of the taxpayer. 2 In Murphy, the Tax Court used
various judicial doctrines to hold that the taxpayer's valuation dis-
counts were not legitimate. In contrast, in Church, the federal district
court declined to use judicial doctrines and instead upheld the le-
gitimacy of the taxpayer's valuation discounts.
The striking difference in outcomes between the Murphy and
Church decisions raises an important question: what role, if any,
should judicial doctrines—i.e., the substance over form doctrine, the
business purpose doctrine, and the step transaction doctrine—play in
resolving transfer tax controversies? This Article seeks to answer this
question. Section I traces the role of judicial doctrines in resolving
income tax controversies. Section II discusses the role these doctrines
have played in resolving transfer tax controversies. On the basis of this
background, Section III turns from the descriptive to the prescriptive.
It uses the Murphy and Church decisions to assess the merits of using
judicial doctrines to resolve transfer tax cases. This Article concludes
that judicial doctrines should serve only a limited role in resolving
transfer tax controversies. This limited role should be taken into ac-
count by the Service when it enforces compliance, by taxpayers when
they plan their estates, and by Congress when it crafts transfer tax leg-
islation.
. I. THE USE OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINES IN RESOLVING INCOME TAX
CONTROVERSIES
The use of judicial doctrines to curtail tax avoidance is pervasive
in the area of income taxation. 3 There are several reasons for this
phenomenon: central among them is that courts believe that if the
Internal Revenue Code ("Code") were read literally, impermissible
tax avoidance would become the norm rather than the exception. 4
No matter how perceptive the legislature, it cannot anticipate all
2 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 60,369, at 84,781 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2000).
3 See generally BORIS I. LIMBER & LAWRENCE LORREN, I FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND Gtrrs 1 4.3.1, at 4-24 (3d. ed. 1999); Alan Gunu, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH. L.
R.Ev. 733, 733 (1978); Ralph S. Rice, Judicial Techniques in Combating Tax Avoidance, 51
MICH, L. REV. 1021, 1021 (1953); Joshua D. Rosenberg, Tax Avoidance and Income Measure-
ment, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 385-92 (1988); Harry J. Rudick, The Problem of Personal Income
Tax Avoidance, 7 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 260-63 (1940).
4 See Joseph Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation, 49 U. Cm. L. REV.
859, 880 (1982).
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events and circumstances that may unfold, 5 and, due to linguistic limi-
tations, statutes do not always capture the essence of what is in-
tended.6 Judicial doctrines fill the void left either by the legislature or
by the words of the Code. Another reason for the popularity of these
doctrines is that courts do not want to appear duped by taxpayers;
therefore courts use these doctrines to reveal the "true essence" of a
transaction.?
Despite this popularity, courts do not invoke judicial doctrines on
a consistent basis. This is because a certain amount of tax avoidance is
permissible—even encouraged—under the Code. Take, for example,
the taxation of long-term capital gains. If a capital asset is held for
more than one year, 8 gain upon the sale of the capital asset enjoys
preferential tax treatment .8 No one would assert that a taxpayer who
sells a capital asset after holding title to it for 366 days is engaging in
impermissible tax avoidance.
But other kinds of tax avoidance techniques are not sanctioned
under the Code. For example, a court may ignore a putative lease
agreement if the aggregate lease payments equal the underlying as-
5 See Rice, supra note 3, at 1022 ("Prescience of statutory draftsmen and members of
Congress is limited, and it may not be assumed that Congress could foresee all transactions
possible and agree upon a line of demarcation between the taxability of each.").
6 See id. ("[If we attempted to fashion language in a manner to account for all distinc-
tions, itl would lead to a statute so complex that by comparison the present Code would be
rudimentary.").
7 See Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 882. In Carriage Square, Inc. a Commissioner, one judge
observed that:
All the members of the Court recognize that the tax avoidance scheme of
[the taxpayer and his accountant) cannot be allowed to stand. It is an obvious
attempt, and a somewhat crude attempt, lacking in legitimate business pur-
pose, to spread large anticipated sums of ordinary income among several
taxpayer[sJ.... The only disagreement among the members of the Court is
how best to set aside the tax avoidance scheme.
69 T.C. 119, 130-31 (1977) (Golfe, J., concurring). Commenting about a complex transac-
tion that involved the use of an intermediary named "W.R. Deal," the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit declared that, 'The Deal deal was not the real deal. That ends
it." Blueberry Land Co. v. C.I.R., 361 F.2d 93, 102 (5th Cir. 1966).
The tax bar may be an indirect contributor to the popularity of these doctrines, in
put because it has a financial stake in promoting its ability to navigate skillfully the tax
waters left otherwise clouded by judicial doctrines. See Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 883.
Professors Bittker and Lokken explain that the vagueness of these doctrines serves an im-
portant function because "when the meaning of a provision is veiled by fog, taxpayers usu-
ally tread more warily than when the landmarks are clearly visible." BITTKER & LOKKEN,
supra note 3, at 4-26.
8 I.R.C. § 1222 (1984).
9 I.R.C. § 1 (h) (1988) .
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set's purchase price, the lease is for a tailor-made sprinkler system,
and the lease is silent regarding its consequences after its terms have
expired." Under these and similar circumstances, courts will rely on
the use of judicial doctrines to "call a duck a duck" in order to thwart
taxpayers' attempts to impair congressional tax policy," contradict the
intent of a statute," or jeopardize the federal fisc."
Three separate judicial doctrines form the central structure in
the defense against impermissible tax avoidance: (A) the substance
over form doctrine, (B) the business purpose doctrine, and (C) the
step transaction doctrine. They operate as the courts' fingers to plug
holes in the fiscal dike left unintentionally open by the legislature or
by the literal words of the Code.
A. The Substance Over Form Doctrine
Under the Code, the form a transaction takes often determines
its substance and, thus, its tax consequences." For example, suppose
the members of a partnership agree to pay a particular partner
$100,000 annually, notwithstanding the partnership's income. The
form of this payment dictates that it is a guaranteed payment." As
such, the $100,000 allocation will bear the tax effects associated with
being a guaranteed payment rather than a distributive share of the
partnership profits, even if the latter classification would prove
financially beneficial to the partner receiving the payment.
1 ° See Estate of Starr v. Comin'r, 274 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1959).
See, e.g., Cotiun'r v. Court Holding, 324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945) ('To permit the true
nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax
liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Con-
gress.").
12 See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) ('The whole undertaking
... was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate
reorganization, and nothing else.... To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above
reality and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious purpose.").
15 See, e.g., Comin'r v. Phipps, 336 U.S. 410, 417 (1949) (limiting carryover of deficits
in reorganizations was appropriate based on the need to prevent escape of earnings and
profits from taxation).
14 See generally Walter f. Blum, The Importance of Form in the Taxation of Cmporate Thansac-
lions, 54 TAXES 613 (1976); Charles I. Kingson, The Deep Structure of Taxation: Dividend Dis-
hibutions, 85 YALE U. 861, 863-66 (1976). Having chosen a particular form, taxpayers are
not at liberty "to disavow their prior representations, under such circumstances that would
invite similar intentional deceit on the part of other taxpayers seeking to gain a tax
benefit." Cluck v. Conine'', 105 T.C. 324, 332 (1995) (citing Lefever v. Conint'r, 103 T.C.
525, 544 (1994), affd, 100 F.3d 778 (10th Cu: 1996)).
15 1.R.C. § 707(c) (1986).
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Other form choices do not determine substance. In these cases,
courts decide that tax consequences should not stein from form. For
example, suppose an attorney drafts a client's will. In lieu of being
directly compensated for his services, in the client's will, the attorney
drafts a specific, tax-exempt bequest to himself. 16 The form of this be-
quest, however, belies that its substance is really a deferred payment
for services rendered, which is subject to tax. 17 In circumstances such
as this, courts have set aside the form of the transaction and have de-
clared that its substance controls. 18
Courts prefer giving greater weight to the substance of a transac-
tion over its form because the latter may be easily manipulated or
used in self-serving fashions. This is particularly true in transactions
between related or friendly parties. Consider, for example, two 50%
shareholders who lend an equal amount of money to their wholly-
owned corporation. In return, the corporation issues each share-
holder a debt instrument and deducts interest payments as they ma-
ture. 19 A court can recharacterize the shareholder loans as capital
contributions and the interest payments as nondeductible dividend
payments." Courts do not think themselves bound by taxpayers' la-
bels that bear little, if any, consequence aside from their beneficial tax
effects.
The case that is said to have legitimized the substance over form
approach is Gregory v. Helvering. 0 In Gregory, the taxpayer held all the
shares in one corporation (Company A) that owned several assets,
including shares in another corporation (Company B) . An opportu-
nity arose to sell the shares in Company B at a large profit. If Com-
pany A sold the Company B shares, it would have experienced a large
gain, and any distributions made to the taxpayer would have consti-
tuted dividends, taxable at ordinary income tax rates. To minimize
her taxes, the taxpayer arranged for the transfer of Company B shares
to a newly formed corporation (Company C), in which she would
16 1.R.C. § 102(a) (1986).
§ 61 (1984).
18 See Wolder v. Conun'r, 493 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding bequest made in
lieu of compensation taxable to attorney who performed legal services on behalf of the
decedent).
12 I.R.C. § 163 (1994).
" See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694, 699 (3d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Snyder Eros., 367 F.2d 980, 985 (5th Cir. 1966).
21 See 293 U.S. at 470.
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hold all the stock. 22 Three days later, Company C was liquidated and,
under the then-corporate liquidation provisions of the Code, the
shares of Company B passed tax-free to the taxpayer. The taxpayer
immediately sold the Company B shares, reporting a net capital gain.
The issue before the court was whether the form of the transac-
tion (a tax-free reorganization) or its substance (Company A's sale of
Company B's shares followed by a distribution to the taxpayer) should
decide the tax effects. The Board of Tax Appeals had ruled in the
taxpayer's favor. The essence of its opinion is captured in a single sen-
tence related to the reorganization statute: "A statute so meticulously
drafted must be interpreted as a literal expression of the taxing policy
and leaves only the small interstices for judicial consideration." 28
Judge Learned Hand, however, writing for the Second Circuit, re-
versed the Board's decision.24 While acknowledging that taxpayers are
at liberty to minimize their taxes,25 he concluded that the taxpayer's
reliance upon the reorganization statute was inappropriate. More
specifically, he declared that the "reorganization" undertaken by the
taxpayer was devoid of substance and intended strictly as a tax mini-
mization device; thus, it could not be "contemplated as a corporate
reorganization. "26
The United States Supreme Court affirmed Judge Hand's opin-
ion and echoed his sentiments, stating "[t] he whole undertaking,
though conducted according to the terms of [the reorganization stat-
ute], was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance mas-
querading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing else." 27 Having
the endorsement of both Judge Hand and the Supreme Court, the
substance over form doctrine has become a hallmark of tax jurispru-
dence.28 Judges have invoked it in cases involving sale leasebacks, fain-
22 More specifically, the shareholder had Company A contribute its Company B shares
to Company C in return for Company C shares. The capital contribution left Company A
as the parent of Company C, which owned all of the shares in Company B. Pursuant to the
then-corporate reorganization provisions of the Code, Company A then distributed Com-
pany C stock to the taxpayer. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 203(c), 43
Stat. 253, 256 (the predecessor to section 368(a) (1) (D) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986). The reorganization left Companies A and C wholly owned by the taxpayer.
" Gregory v. Havering, 27 B.T.A. 223, 225 (1932).
24 Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 811 (2d Cir. 1934).
25 Id. at 810.
26 Id. at 811.
27 Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
28 A judge has referred to this doctrine as the cornerstone of sound taxation." Estate
of Weinert v. Comm'r, 294 F.2d 750, 755 (5th Cir. 1961). Not all commentators, however,
would agree with that conclusion. See Isenbergh, supra note 4, at 864-78; Karen Nelson
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ily trusts, interest deductions, and in a myriad of other income tax
controversies."
Over time, two distinct analytical components of the substance
over form doctrine have emerged." One component relates to fact-
finding and the other to statutory construction. Courts use the fact-
finding component to analyze whether what the taxpayer purported
to do corresponds with what was actually done; for example, whether
a bequest is really a bequest or something different. 31 When this com-
ponent of the substance over form doctrine applies, the task before
the courts is to make adroit fact determinations.32 Courts also use the
statutory construction component of the substance over form doc-
trine to determine the figurative and purposeful, rather than literal,
meaning of certain terms of art as they are employed in the Code; for
example, the meaning of the phrase "corporate reorganization" in the
corporate business context." When this analytical component of the
substance over form doctrine applies, the task before the courts is to
distill congressional word usage a's well as congressional intent."
B. The Business Purpose Doctrine
Courts require that transactions be driven by business rather than
by tax considerations." Under the business purpose doctrine, if a
Moore, The Sham Thansaction Doctrine: An Outmoded, and Unnecessary Approach to Combating
'nix Avoidance, 41 FLA. L. Rev. 659 (1989). Even Judge Learned Hand lamented that the
judicial search for "substance" sometimes becomes an "anodyne for the pains of reason-
ing." Cornn'rv. Sansone, 60 F.2d 931,933 (2d Cir. 1932).
25 For a detailed synopsis of income tax cases involving the substance over form doc-
trine, see Moore, supra note 28, at 683-719.
50 See Isenbcrgh, supra note 4, at 865-66; see also Kirchman v. Comm'r, 862 F.2d 1486,
1490 (11th Cir. 1989).
31 See, e.g., Wolder, 493 F.2d at 611-12.
32 Under circumstances in which this part of the substance over form doctrine applies,
courts may assert that the taxpayer engaged in a sham. See Kirchrnan, 862 F.2d at 1492
("Shams in fact are transactions that never occur. Irr such shams, taxpayers claim deduc-
tions for transactions that have been created on paper but which never took place.").
33 See, e.g., Gregory, 293 U.S. at 470.
34 Under circumstances in which this part of the substance over form doctrine applies,
courts often assert that the taxpayer has misread or misunderstood the Code. See Gregory,
69 F.2d at 811 ("[T]heir only defect was that they were not what the statute means by a
'reorganization,' because the transactions were not part of the conduct of the business of
either or both companies.").
35 See generally Peter L. Faber, Business Purpose and Section 355, 43 Tax Law. 855 (1990);
David P. Ha•iton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX Law. 235 (1999); Rob-
ert Thornton Smith, Business Purpose: The Assault Upon the Citadel. 53 TAX LAW. 1 (1999).
For an historical analysis of the business purpose doctrine, see Boris 1. Maker, li7tat Is
"Business Propose" in Reorganization?, 8 N.Y.U. Itqs .r. ON FED. TAX'N 134 (1950); Arthur M.
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transaction lacks a profit potential aside from its tax effects, courts
disallow what the Code otherwise sanctions. 36 The theory underlying
this doctrine is that Congress extends tax benefits only to those tax-
payers who enhance their wealth from sources other than the coffers
of the government."
Application of the business purpose doctrine is common in tax
shelter cases.38 Courts adjudicating tax shelter cases often ask
"whether the transaction has any practical economic effects other
than the creation of tax losses." 39
 If it does, courts will ordinarily rule
in the taxpayer's favor.44 Conversely, if a transaction is strictly tax
driven, courts will ordinarily rule in the Service's favor. 41 In other
words, courts only honor those transactions that are motivated by
business considerations. There is, however, no business activity
"threshold" that will legitimize a particular transaction; in the eyes of
the court, a commercial transaction imbued with even an iota of busi-
ness purpose usually legitimizes it.
Two factors limit the breadth of the business purpose doctrine.
First, there are some transactions that are non-commercial and, thus,
do not lend themselves to a business purpose analysis. These transac-
tions include alimony payments, charitable contributions, and medi-
cal expenses. Second, there are some transactions where it is clear,
that Congress does not require taxpayers to be motivated by eco-
Michaelson, "Business Purpose" and Tax-Free Reorganization, 61 YALE L1. 14 (1952); Harvey
M. Spear, "Corporate Business Purpose" in Reorganization, 3 TAX L. REV. 225 (1947). For a
critical analysis of this doctrine, see Robert S. Summers, A Critique of the Business-Purpose
Doctrine, 41 OR. L. REV. 38 (1961).
36 See generally Hoffman F. Fuller, Business Purpose, Sham Transactions and the Relation of
Private Law to the Law of Taxation, 37 Tut.. L. REV. 355 (1963); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Re-
quirenrent of Economic Profit in Tax Motivated Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (1981).
37 See Goldstein v. Connn'r, 364 F.2d 734, 740 (2d Cir. 1966) ("[Recognition of an ar-
rangement depends upon whether such arrangement can be said] to have purpose, sub-
stance or utility apart from [its] anticipated tax consequences.").
" Recent tax shelter cases where the business purpose doctrine has been used to de-
feat taxpayers' tax minimization attempts include Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. a Commissioner, 113
T.C. 254, 294 (1999) (denying interest deductions on corporate-owned life insurance);
Compaq Computer corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 214, 215 (1999) (denying the use of for-
eign tax credits), and United Parcel Seru v, Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 262, 293 (1999)
(finding that the sole purpose of corporate restructuring was to avoid tax).
39
 ACM P'ship v. Counter, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Jacobson v.
Conun'r, 915 F.2d 832, 837 (2d Cir. 1990)).
4° See Frank Lyons Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1978) (holding govern-
ment must honor transactions that are governed by tax-independent considerations that
are not shaped entirely by tax-avoidance features); see also Bernard Wolfinan, The Supreme
Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure offudicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1981).
41 See supra note 38.
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nomic profit. Instead, tax considerations alone may serve as the tax-
payers' motivating force. For example, taxpayers may invest in low-
income housing projects predicated solely upon the profit opportu-
nity associated with low-income housing credits offered under the
Code.42
Just as the substance over form doctrine owes its genesis to Greg-
ory, the business purpose doctrine, in large part, does as well. In
'summarizing the outcome of Gregory in another case, Judge Learned
Hand stressed the importance of grounding a transaction with a busi-
ness purpose:
The doctrine of Gregory v. Havering 	 means that in con-
struing words of the tax statute which describe commercial
or industrial transactions we are to understand them to refer
to transactions entered upon for commercial or industrial
purposes and not to include transactions entered upon for
no other motive but to escape taxation.°
The Supreme Court's position regarding the importance of busi-
ness purpose in Gregory has been affirmed time after time. Indeed,
courts have used Gregory in ways likely never anticipated by Judge
Hand or the Supreme Court. Consider the case of Goldstein v. Commis-
sioner." The taxpayer in Goldstein had the good fortune to win a lot-
tery. To minimize the tax consequences associated with her lottery
winnings, the taxpayer borrowed money from four banks at an inter-
est rate of 4%, invested the borrowed funds in United States Treasury
notes paying interest of 1.5%, and prepaid several years of interest on
the borrowed funds.
This arrangement was designed to help the taxpayer offset the
immediate income tax burden stemming from her lottery winnings.
The version of the Code effective at that time allowed the taxpayer a
deduction for prepaid interest. 45 The Service nevertheless challenged
the allowance of this deduction. Affirming the Tax Court, the Second
Circuit upheld the Service's position. Dismissing the literal words of
the Code, the Second Circuit declared that a deduction is only
"proper if there is some substance to the loan arrangement beyond
42
 I.R.C. § 42.
Colunei v. Trans. Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1949).
44 See 364 F.2d 734, 734 (2d Cir. 1966).
95 I.R.C. § 163(a) (1958).
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the taxpayer's desire to secure the deduction."46 Courts and commen-
tators have interpreted this declaration to mean that no tax benefits
will accrue if a transaction is predicated entirely upon tax avoidance
rather than some other purposeful business activity. 47
C. The Step Transaction Doctrine
Courts are sometimes unwilling to evaluate each part of a trans-
action in isolation from its related parts. Put differently, circumstances
or conditions may exist that warrant viewing all of the steps of a trans-
action as a whole. Courts commonly refer to this approach to tax
analysis as an application of the step transaction doctrine. 49 Three dis-
tinct tests form the foundation of this doctrine: 49 the binding com-
mitment test, the end result test, and the mutual interdependence
test. Courts combine the separate parts of a transaction if (i) the legs
of a transaction are linked by a binding commitment, 5° (ii) each step
of the transaction could not stand without the culmination of a par-
ticular event,51
 or (iii) each step of a transaction requires the comple-
tion of another step until the taxpayer reaches the desired result.52
46 Goldstein, 364 F.2d at 741; see also Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 366 (1960)
("Mt is patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by Knetsch from this
transaction beyond a tax deduction.").
47 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Comin'r, 94 T.C. 738, 767 (1990) (*The principle of [Goldstein]
would not, as petitioners suggest, permit deductions merely because a taxpayer had or
experienced some de minintis gain. Goldstein, to the contrary, holds that the transactions,
in form, were real, but that they lacked substance.").
48 A statement delivered by Justice Sutherland in Minnesota Tea Co. u Helvering captures
the essence of the step transaction doctrine: "A given result at the end of a straight path is
not made a different result because reached by following a devious path." 302 U.S. 609,
613 (1938).
42 See McDonald's Restaurants of Ill., Inc. v. Conun'r, 688 F.2d 520, 524-25 (7th Cir.
1982).
56 See, e.g., Coatun'r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) ("[I]f one transaction is to be
characterized as a 'first step' there must be a binding commitment to take the later
steps."); Intermountain Lumber Co. v. Conint'r, 65 T.C. 1025, 1033 (1976) (holding that
I.R.C. § 351 did not apply where a taxpayer who otherwise would have been part of the
control group had a binding obligation to sell his shares).
51 See, e.g., King Enters, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969)
("[Pituportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated into a single transaction when
it appears that they were really component parts of a single transaction intended from the
outset to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result.").
52 See, e.g., Redding v. Comm's ., 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980) (indicating that the
issue is whether "the steps are so interdependent that the legal relations created by one
transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the series.").
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Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. provides a useful illustration of
when and how the step transaction doctrine applies." In Court Hold-
ing Co., a corporate taxpayer owned an apartment complex that had
appreciated in value. 54 The sole  shareholders of the corporate tax-
payer were a married couple. On its behalf, they entered into negotia-
tions with an unrelated third party to sell the apartment complex.
These negotiations resulted in an oral sales agreement. To avoid the
corporate level tax, however, the shareholders liquidated the corpora-
tion and had title to the apartment complex placed in their individual
names. The shareholders then sold the apartment complex to the
same third party on terms identical to those previously negotiated on
behalf of the corporation. 55
The Service challenged the corporate liquidation, asserting that
the corporation, rather than its shareholders, had sold the apartment
complex. In analyzing the transaction, the Supreme Court agreed
with the Service's position. In a terse opinion, the Court said that:
the transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step,
from the commencement of negotiations to the consumma-
tion of the sale, is relevant. A sale by one person cannot be
transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another using
the latter as a conduit through which to pass title."
The Court chose to ignore the liquidation as an unnecessary step de-
signed to mask the true end sought by the taxpayers—avoidance of
the corporate level tax. In the Court's opinion, respecting the legiti-
macy of the corporate liquidation "would seriously impair the effec-
tive administration of the tax policies of Congress.""
Just as was the case with the substance over form doctrine and the
business purpose doctrine, the step transaction doctrine has become a
central feature in income tax adjudication. Its use is particularly pro-
53 See 324 U.S. 331, 331 (1945). The step transaction doctrine has a long and distin-
guished history that stems back as far as 1932; see also Warner Co. v. Conun'r, 26 B.T.A.
1225, 1228 (1932) (holding that a corporate reorganization provision "permits, if it does
not require, an examination of the several steps taken which culminated in the taxpayer's
acquisition of the [company's] .assets."); Carter Pubrns, Inc. v. Conmer, 28 B.T.A. 160, 164
(1933) ('The whole series of acts, corporate and otherwise, constituted only a single trans-
action.").
54 See 324 U.S. at 332.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 334.
r Id.
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flounced in the corporate income tax area of the law. 58 Courts skill-
fully apply this doctrine to see the forest rather than taxpayers' delib-
erately planted trees that would otherwise camouflage their carefully
laid tax avoidance schemes.
II. THE USE OF JUDICIAL DOCTRINES IN RESOLVING TRANSFER TAX
CONTROVERSIES
Before examining the role of judicial doctrines in resolving trans-
fer tax controversies, 58
 a few important observations should be made.
In analyzing tax avoidance cases, courts commonly relegate the im-
portance of taxpayer motive. 60
 This is because taxpayers' agendas in-
variably include tax reduction. 8) Making a determination that a tax-
payer is motivated to reduce taxes states nothing more than the
obvious. A taxpayer's motive, however, to avoid taxes does not go
completely unnoticed; when tax avoidance is the taxpayer's overarch-
ing objective, courts often reflectively employ judicial doctrines to
gauge the legitimacy of a taxpayer's transaction. 62
58 See Richard D. Hobbet, The Step Transaction Doctrine and Its Effect on Corporate Transac-
tions, 19 Tur.. TAX INST. 102 (1970); Seymour S. Mintz & William T. Plumb, Jr., Step Transac-
tions in Corporate Reorganizations, 12 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX'N 247 (1954); Note, Step
Transactions, 24 U. MIAMI L. REV. 60 (1969).
" Transfer tax controversies involve issues of gift, estate, generation-sldpping uansfe•,
and valuation issues found respectively under Chapters 11, 12, 13, and 14 of the Code.
60 In Gregory, Judge Learned Hand issued a statement downplaying the relevance of a
taxpayer's motive:
[A] transaction, otherwise within an exception of the tax law, does not lose its
immunity, because it is actuated by a desire to avoid, or, if one choose, to
evade, taxation. Any one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes shall be as
low as possible; lie is not bound to choose that pattern which will best pay the
Treasury; there is not even a patriotic duty to increase one's taxes.
Gregory v. Helvering, 69 F.2d 809, 810 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
61 There is perhaps DO better or more accurate statement on this generalization than
that issued by judge Learned Hand in a dissenting opinion:
Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so ar-
ranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so,
rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more
than the law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary contribu-
tions. To demand more in the name of morals is mere cant.
Comin'r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, J., dissenting).
ss See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 582 (1941) (striking down tax savings
device because tax avoidance was "obvious purpose and effect" of transaction); cf. Conitu'r
v. Webster's Estate, 131 F.2d 426, 429 (5th Cir. 1942) ("[T]he record clearly shows that
several business considerations prompted the selection of the merger as the means by
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Consider the relevance of these observations in light of estate
planning. As a general proposition, when taxpayers plan their estates,
they wish to pass as much wealth as they can at the smallest possible
transfer tax cost. Certainly a taxpayer may have other objectives as
well, such as ensuring that the assets of his or her estate pass to the
children of his or her first marriage, but tax avoidance is often the
central reason for incurring the costs associated with estate planning.
Given that the very foundation of estate planning often rests upon tax
avoidance,65 the role judicial doctrines should play is unclear. On the
one hand, courts might commonly use these doctrines as interpretive
vehicles to combat tax avoidance; on the other hand, because of the
systemic (and accepted?) tax avoidance nature of estate planning,
courts might shy away from using judicial doctrines.
These observations suggest that the use of judicial doctrines in
resolving transfer tax controversies may have its own set of unique
characteristics. The next three subsections of this analysis explore how
courts have employed judicial doctrines to combat transfer tax avoid-
ance notwithstanding the fact that their use may be inappropriate.
A. The Substance Over Form Doctrine
Form often plays a prominent role in dictating the transfer tax
consequences associated with estate planning. The use of irrevocable
trusts funded with life insurance illustrates this point. Life insurance
owned by a taxpayer at the time of a taxpayer's death is includible in
the taxpayer's gross estate. 64 To avoid this outcome, estate planners
usually recommend that the taxpayer establish an irrevocable trust
which to accomplish their intended result. That tax avoidance was one of the considera-
tions is of no importance.").
Note the overlap between and among these judicial doctrines. Take, for instance, the
Court Holding Co. decision cited to in the prior section where the shareholders liquidated
the corporation immediately prior to the sale of its one asset in order to avoid a corporate
level tax. See 329 U.S. 331, 331 (1945). Court Holding Co. is cited with regularity in support
of not only the step transaction doctrine, for example, Commissioner a Clark, 489 U.S. 726,
738 (1989), but also of the substance over form doctrine, for example, Kirrhman u Commis-
sioner, 862 F.2d 1486, 1491 (11th Cir. 1989), and the business purpose doctrine, for exam-
ple, Estate of Helliwell a Commissioner, 77 T.C. 964, 989 (1981). The overlap among these
doctrines is not a mere coincidence; it springs front their common objective to curtail
impermissible tax avoidance.
63 See, e.g., Kincaid v. United States, 682 F.2d 1220, 1225 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[N]o busi-
ness [person] would have entered into this transaction, ... [thus] the moving impulse for
the ... transaction was a desire to pass the family fortune on to others [at minimal transfer
tax cost],") (internal quotations and citation omitted).
64 I.R.C. § 2042 (1994).
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where the trustee of such trust purchases and holds insurance on the
taxpayer's life. By adhering to this strategy, the taxpayer lacks all indi-
cia of policy ownership at death. Policy proceeds, therefore, are not
includible in the taxpayer's gross estate," potentially resulting in
significant transfer tax savings.
Estate planners also want to ensure that all trust contributions
qualify for the annual gift tax exclusion. 66 Only a gift of a "present in-
terest" in property—an unrestricted right to the immediate use, pos-
session, or enjoyment of the property gifted—,however, qualifies for
this exclusion 67 A gift of a "future interest" in property—the com-
mencement in use, possession, or enjoyment of the property is limited
to some future date or time—does not qualify." Trusts are generally
designed to defer beneficial ownership." Yet, to capitalize upon the
annual gift tax exclusion, estate planners strategically incorporate
trust terms that provide trust beneficiaries with limited withdrawal
rights (usually for thirty days) thereby transforming otherwise future
interest gifts into present interest gifts."
To illustrate, suppose X is married to Y and together they have
two adult children, A and B. Suppose further that X wishes to obtain a
$5,000,000 life insurance policy and that the annual premium ex-
penses associated with maintaining this policy are $50,000. To mini-
mize the size of his gross estate, X establishes an irrevocable trust,
naming his wife, Y, as trustee. X then makes a $50,000 contribution to
the trust. The terms of the trust provide Y with the right to withdraw
$10,000 and A and B each with the right to withdraw $20,000 within
thirty days of this trust contribution by X. Assuming no one exercises
his or her withdrawal right, Y, in her capacity as trustee, can use the
trust contribution to obtain and pay for the life insurance policy on
X's life. Each $50,000 trust contribution qualifies for the gift tax an-
65
 I.R.C. § 2033 (1994).
66 Currently, $10,000 annually per donee and $20,000 per donee when spouses agree
to split their gifts. LR.C. § 2503(b) (1).
67
 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b). See also Conim'r v. Disston, 325 U.S. 992, 496-47 (1995);
Fondren v. Conun'r, 324 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1945); Rev. Rttl. 81-7, 1981-1 C.B. 474.
88
 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-3(b). See also Ryerson V. United States, 312 U.S. 405, 408
(1941); United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 403 (1941).
68 See generally I AUSTIN W. SCOTT, TILE LAW OF TRUSTS § 2 (William F. Fratcher ed.,
4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1998).
7° For an overview of how these trusts operate and the transfer tax benefits associated
with their use, see Marc A. Choiney, Transfer Tax Issues Raised by Crummy Pourt3, 33 REAL.
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755 (1999).
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nual exclusion, and the life insurance proceeds on X's life will not be
includible in his gross estate.
Courts have consistently upheld the legitimacy of X's arrange-
ment and those of similarly situated taxpayers. 71 This is true even
though the substance of these trusts manifests the taxpayers' transfer
tax avoidance agenda. More specifically, taxpayers—and their advi-
sors—make no secret that the purpose of these trusts is to avoid all
transfer taxes. 72 No one, for example, expects trust beneficiaries to
exercise their withdrawal rights because doing so would thwart the
trustee's ability to maintain the insurance policy on the senior's life by
reducing the amount of funds otherwise available to pay the pre-
mium. The settlor of the trust may even increase the availability of the
annual gift tax exclusion by vesting remote contingent beneficiaries,
like grandchildren and great-grandchildren, with rights of with-
drawal."
Courts analyzing these trust arrangements usually ask the follow-
ing two questions. First, does the taxpayer have any direct indicia of
policy ownership? If not, there is no estate tax inclusion of the life in-
surance proceeds in the taxpayer's gross estate. Second, does the trust
beneficiary have a legal demand right? If so, the taxpayer's trust con-
tribution qualifies for the annual gift tax exclusion.74 In resolving
71 See, e.g., Gramme), v. Conim'r, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
72 See Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Emperor Does Not Need Clothes—The Expanding Use of "Na-
ked" Crummey Powers to Obtain Federal CO Tax Annual Exclusions, 73 Tut.. L. REV. 555, 616
(1998) ("The Service's resolve to continue its efforts to limit Crununey powers is stoked by
its opinion that Crummey powers, particularly naked Cruminey powers, are essentially
shams—an observation shared by numerous commentators."); Benjamin N. Henszey,
Cnimmey Power Revisited, 59 TAXES 76, 77 (1981) ("[T]he IRS is aware that the [Cruntiney)
power is a sham in most cases ...."); Willard 11. Pedrick, Crummey Is Really Crummy!, 20
ARIZ. ST. U. 943, 946 (1988) ("[R] ecently in 1987 the [IRS] recognized that taxpayer's
counsel can try to make too much of a good thing out of the Cruminey principle."); Chris-
topher Steenson, A Reluctant Stance by the Internal Revenue Service: The Uncertain Future of the
Use of the Section 2503(b) Annual CO Exclusion Following Cmtnmey and Cristofani, 38 SANTA
CEARA L. REV. 589, 609 (1998) ("(Tihe IRS has indicated that it will challenge the use of
the Crummey power only when the substance of the transfer clearly indicates that the do-
nor's purpose in making the gift is to obtain the section 2503(b) annual exclusion and not
to benefit the recipient.").
73 Under these circumstances, courts have held that the settlor's trust contributions
pertaining to these remote beneficiaries still qualify for the gift tax annual exclusion. See
Estate of Cristofani v. Coitun'r, 97 T.C. 74, 84 (1991) ("Although decedent's grandchildren
never exercised their respective withdrawal rights, this does not vitiate the fact that they
had the legal right to do so."); see also Estate of Kohlsaat v. Comm'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2732,
2733 (1997).
74 Jeffrey G. Sherman, 77s a Gift to be Simple: The Need for a New Definition of "Future Inter-
est" for Gift 'Mx Pmposes, 55 U. CIN. L. Rev. 585, 655-56 (1987) ("[A]l though the IRS is
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these questions, courts do not consider the likelihood that X and X's
family members can and are apt to collude. This potential for con-
spiracy casts harsh shadows on indicia of control issues and the bona.
fide nature of the beneficiaries' withdrawal rights. Nevertheless, the
courts focus on the form of these insurance trust arrangements rather
than on their substance. With respect to resolving transfer tax contro-
versies, insurance trusts are just one illustration of the important role
that form plays. The field of estate planning is replete with other ex-
at:vies:75
In general, courts rarely challenge taxpayers' transfer tax mini-
mization strategies by invoking the substance over form doctrine. The
courts' reluctance stems from the nature of the substance over form
doctrine and that of estate planning. Recall that the substance over
form doctrine has two distinct analytical components: one that courts
use to make fact determinations and the other for statutory construc-
tion. Insofar as the statutory construction component of the sub-
stance over form doctrine is concerned, consider how the business
and investment worlds commonly imbue words with special meanings
that transform them into terms of art. These terms of art—such as the
meaning of the term "corporate reorganization" in Gregory—often
result in courts having to engage in statutory construction exercises
that necessitate judicial doctrine use.
justified in its opposition to Crummy . . . there is no logical basis, ... as the IRS has finally,
albeit reluctantly, conceded.").
75
 Consider that taxpayers may establish sacalled Section 2503(c) trusts for the benefit
of minor children. As a condition for trust contributions qualifying for the  al exclu-
sion, the assets of the trust must vest with the child by age twenty-one. Estate planners of-
ten incorporate this vesting schedule, but add that if the minor does not exercise his or
her withdrawal right at age twenty-one, the trust assets will remain in further trust until a
later time, say age thirty-five. When taxpayers establish these trusts, they often do so with
the full expectation that they do not intend their children—the beneficiaries of the trust—
to exercise their withdrawal rights. Now, even the Service recognizes the legitimacy of
these arrangements. See Rev. Rut. 74-43,1974-1 C.B. 285.
Likewise, if a partnership is validly formed under state law it is respected as having a
bona fide existence although the partners themselves ignore the entity's existence. For
example, in Knight u Commissioner, taxpayers validly formed a limited partnership under
Texas law. The partnership did not keep any records, prepared no annual reports, had no
employees, and never conducted any business. Nonetheless, the partnership was respected
as being legitimate for gift tax valuation purposes. See 115 T.C. 506 (2000). Accord Strangi v.
Conun'r, 115 T.C. 478 (2000) (holding that where partnership validly formed under state
law for the sole purpose of minimizing the taxpayer's estate tax—indeed, partnership as-
sets were used to meet the taxpayer's personal expenses—"Irjegardless of subjective inten-
tions, the partnership had sufficient substance to be recognized for tax purposes [because]
its existence would not be disregarded by potential purchasers of decedent's assets").
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In contrast, an analysis of transfer tax issues generally requires
fewer statutory construction exercises. Put differently, words and
phrases in the sphere of estate planning such as "indicia of owner-
ship" and "present interest gift" are more apt to be used in a literal
rather than in a figurative fashion. Thus, courts have little need to
apply the part of the substance over form doctrine that attempts to
discern figurative meanings."
But courts have not abandoned the factual determination com-
ponent of the substance over form doctrine that essentially declares
that a taxpayer cannot call a duck a swan." Heyen v. United States illus-
trates this point in the estate planning context." In Heyen, a taxpayer
transferred blocks of stock, each individually valued by her to be less
than $10,000 (the maximum annual gift tax exclusion) to twenty-nine
beneficiaries. Twenty-seven of the twenty-nine beneficiaries immedi-
ately signed the stock certificates in blank so that the stock could be
reissued to the taxpayer's family. The form of these gifts would have
qualified them for the annual gift tax exclusion. The Tenth Circuit,
however, ignored the form of the taxpayer's gifts, ruling instead that
the substance of this transaction was that the taxpayer had really made
stock gifts to her family members, not to the twenty-nine shills." Many
other courts have followed the Heyen example to expose supposed
swans to be ducks. 8°
" See Estate of Frank v. Connu'r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2255, 2259 (1995) ("As a general
rule, we will respect the form of a transaction. We will not apply substance over form un-
less the circumstances so warrant.").
77 See, e.g., Estate of Starr v. Counter, 274 F.2d 294, 295 (9th Cir. 1959); Lee v. United
States, 86-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 113,649 (W.D. Ky. 1985) (holding substance determines
the character of transactions for purposes of section 2036, regardless of the form).
78 See 945 F.2d 359, 361 (10th Cir. 1991).
79 See id. at 364-65.
8° See, e.g., Estate of Maxwell v. Comin'r, 3 F.3d 591, 591 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding
mother's transfer of personal residence to son a transfer of a retained life estate, not a
bona fide sale for full and adequate consideration); Schultz v. United States, 493 F.2d 1225,
1225 (4th Cir. 1974) (disallowing use of annual exclusion when two brothers made recip-
rocal gifts to each of their respective three children); Bies v. Comna'r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH)
628 (2000) (holding annual transfers of stock from closely held corporation to daughters-
in-law and granddaughter-in-law actually were indirect transfers to sons made to obtain
additional annual gift tax exclusions); Sather v Comm'r, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 456 (1999)
(applying reciprocal trust doctrine to limit number of present interest annual exclusion
gifts where gifts made by aunt and uncle to niece and nephew predicated upon similar
gifts made by other aunt and uncle to niece and nephew); Griffin v. United States, 42 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 701-02, 707 (D. Tex. 1998) (holding no minority or marketability discount
applied to the value of shares where taxpayer gave 45% interest in wholly-owned company
to wife who, in turn, gave shares to trust because taxpayer's wife was used as mere inter-
mediary to command lower stock valuations); Estate of Cidulka v. Comm'r, 71 T.C.M.
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The substance over form doctrine thus plays a limited role in
transfer tax adjudication. Courts do not use it as a device of statutory
construction, but rather only invoke its use when taxpayers' estate
planning endeavors are not factually anchored to reality.
B. The Business Purpose Doctrine
Given the theoretical underpinnings of the business purpose
doctrine, where the legitimacy of transactions is governed by whether
they have an underlying business purpose, 81 one might think that this
doctrine would play little or no role in resolving transfer tax contro-
versies. This is because, aside from transfer tax minimization, estate
planning usually involves the transfer of wealth from one taxpayer to
another taxpayer; there is nothing in these transfers that is inherently
commercial or economic in nature.
The worlds of business and estate planning, however, are riot mu-
tually exclusive. There are taxpayers, for example, who hold interests
in business enterprises. Interests held in these business enterprises
sometimes constitute something more than mere passive investments;
they represent a taxpayer's lifetime of work and achievement. When
taxpayers attempt to transfer this form of wealth, they often have an-
other agenda item in mind, namely business continuity. These tax-
payers, therefore, take steps—job training or the implementation of a
buy-sell agreement—to help ensure the orderly and smooth transition
of the business enterprise in question from one generation to the
next. For these taxpayers, there is a translucent overlap between estate
planning and business planning.
The Service ordinarily recognizes and respects this overlap. In-
deed, the Service has issued a myriad of administrative rulings that
allow taxpayers to arrange their estate planning affairs in a manner
that fosters business continuity.82 These rulings even go a step further:
(CCH) 2555 (1996) (treating gifts of ten shares to each of controlling shareholder's son,
daughter-in-law, and their two children, coupled with a redemption for less than adequate
consideration of the controlling shareholder's remaining stock, in substance as gift of the
entire controlling interest to the son).
81 See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text.
82 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 42 (discussing circumstances where a corpo-
ration's redemption of its own shares will not constitute a constructive dividend to the
other shareholders); RCA'. Rul. 69-79, 1969-1 C.B. 43 (setting forth the principles to be
applied in determining the tax consequences of the transfer of appreciated property for a
private annuity contract in an Mtn-family exchange); Rev. Rul. 65-289, 1965-2 C.B. 86
(holding corporation's own installment promissory note to be property for purposes of
receiving preferential redemption treatment under I.R.C. § 303).
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for valuation purposes, they permit interests in business enterprises to
reflect, when appropriate, minority and marketability discounts." The
rationale underlying a minority interest discount rests upon a number
of factors, including: a minority interest holder's inability to realize
his or her pro rata share of the entity's net assets through liquidation,
a lack of control over corporate policy, and the payment of dividends,
etc. 84 The rationale underlying a lack of marketability discount rests
upon the principle that a downward price adjustment should be made
because the business, interests are not actively traded or otherwise
readily marketable. 85
The Service does not sanction all forms of business succession
planning, however. On several occasions, for example, the Service has
attacked the validity of valuation discounts when a terminally ill tax-
payer gives away business interests. 86 On several other occasions, the
Service has questioned the legitimacy of arrangements where a tax-
payer establishes a non-operational business enterprise, like a limited
partnership, makes contributions to it of stock or other passive in-
vestments, and then transfers interests in these enterprises at steeply
discounted values.87 From the Service's perspective, these transfers
and arrangements have nothing to do with business continuity and
represent mere transfer tax minimization devices.
Despite the Service's misgivings regarding the validity of these
transfers, its attacks on them have thus far met with only marginal
83 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202. (stating that in determining the value of
gift of minority block of stock in closely-held corporation, block should be valued for gift
tax purposes without regard to family relationship of donee to other shareholders); see also
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-49-001 (Man 11, 1994) (stating that in transfer by gift of 100% of stock to
eleven children in equal shares; each of the eleven gifts entitled to minority discount);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-32-001 (Mar. 28, 1994) (stating that decedent's 48.59% interest be-
queathed to son entitled to minority discount even though son owned the remaining
51.41% interest in company).
" See, e.g., Harwood v. Comm'r, 82 T.C. 239, 267-68 (1984), affd, 786 F.2d 1174 (9th
Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision); Estate of Andrews v. Conun'r, 79 T.C. 938, 957
(1982); Estate of Zaiger v Conun'r, 64 T.C. 927, 945-46 (1975).
85 See, e.g., Mandelbauni v. C0'11111'1; 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2852 (1995), affd, 91 F.3d 124
(3d Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Estate of Ford v. Conini'n 66 T.C.M. (CCH)
1507 (1993), aff d, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995).
86 See, e.g., Tech. Adv. Memo. 97-19-006 ( Jan. 14, 1997) (denying valuation discounts
for stock transferred on behalf of taxpayer taken off life-support system two days prior to
death); Tech. Adv. Memo. 95-04-004 (Oct. 20, 1994) (denying valuation discounts for
stock transferred nineteen days before death by taxpayer suffering from terminal cancer).
87 See, e.g., Field Sem Adv. 19995-0014 (ignoring for transfer tax purposes partnership
funded only with marketable securities insofar as the partners did not truly intend to carry
on a business and share in any profits).
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success. Courts do not apply the business purpose doctrine in the tra-
ditional fashion to inquire into the taxpayers' profit-making objec-
tives. Instead, when it comes to business succession planning, they
deem the business purpose test met as long as one of the taxpayer's
objectives is business continuity.
To illustrate, consider the situation in which a taxpayer forms a
limited partnership with her daughter. The taxpayer contributes
$990,000 of marketable securities in return for a 98% limited partner-
ship interest and a 1% general partnership interest and her daughter
contributes $10,000 cash in return for a 1% limited partnership inter-
est. The partnership conducts no business other than to manage its
investment portfolio. Periodically,' the taxpayer gives limited partner-
ship interests to her daughter, and, for gift tax valuation purposes,
discounts the value of the gifted limited partnership interests by 30%
to reflect their minority stake in the partnership and their lack of
marketability.
In reviewing fact patterns similar to the one posited in this ex-
ample, the Service has concluded that the absence of a business pur-
pose indicates that these arrangements are designed solely as a device
to command lower gift, and estate tax valuations for the taxpayer's
marketable securities. 88 Courts, however, have systematically rejected
the Service's opposition to these kind of arrangements, declaring that
even proper investment portfolio management and its orderly trans-
fer to the next generation constitutes a sufficient business purpose to
legitimize these arrangements. 89
In the end, application of the business purpose doctrine in its
traditional fashion in the estate planning context makes little sense.
88 See id.
89 See, e.g., Estate of Church V. Conmer, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 60,369 (W.D.
Tex. 2000); Estate of Harper v. Cousin's; 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2232 (2000) (recognizing valua-
tion discounts associated with a limited partnership arrangement funded with marketable
securities).
The dissent in Knight a Commissioner succinctly summed up the court's overall ap-
proach:
Generally the economic substance doctrine, with its emphasis on business
purpose, is not a good fit in a tax regime dealing with typically donative trans-
fers. Business purpose will often times be suspect in these transactions be-
cause estate planning usually focuses on tax minimization and involves the
transfer of assets to family 'members. If taxpayers, however, are willing to bur-
den their property with binding legal restrictions that, in fact, reduce the
value of such property, we cannot disregard such restrictions. To do so would
be to disregard economic reality.
115 T.C. 506, 511 (2000) (Foley, J., dissenting).
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This is because profit making is not the force that drives taxpayers to
plan their estates. Instead, for owners and prospective owners of busi-
ness enterprises, business continuity is the Holy Grail of estate plan-
ning. Courts recognize this fact and legitimize transfers on this basis.
C. The Step Transaction Doctrine
Virtually every estate plan shares a similar objective, namely the
orderly distribution of wealth to a taxpayer's intended beneficiaries.
Given this objective, there is a possibility that under the so-called end
result test of the step transaction doctrine—where steps of a transfer
can be collapsed into one when the taxpayer has a final objective in
mind—courts could ignore some steps of a carefully conceived estate
plan." But this rarely happens. No court, for example, has disallowed
the estate tax marital deduction for an otherwise qualifying marital
trust simply because all trust assets ultimately pass to the taxpayer's
children. Courts generally recognize the independence of each ele-
ment of an estate plan.
On a few occasions, however, courts have applied the end result
test in the estate-planning context. In Driver v. United States, for exam-
ple, a taxpayer owned all the shares of a telephone company." As part
of her estate plan, the taxpayer gave a 42% interest in the company
on December 31, 1968, and gave another 42% interest in the com-
pany to the same beneficiaries on January 2, 1969. On her gift tax re-
turn, the taxpayer reflected steep minority and marketability dis-
counts in the value of the gifted shares. On audit, the Service
challenged the legitimacy of these discounts because control of the
company was transferred in two steps, only three days apart. 92
In analyzing the value of the shares, the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Wisconsin applied the end result test of the
step transaction doctrine. The court found that between the two
transfer dates, the taxpayer "transferred a majority interest and con-
trol to her nephew and members of his family."93 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that it was "unreal to be talking about the Decem-
See Redding v. Conini'r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1177 (7th Cir. 1980); see also Strangi, 115 T.C.
at 482 (Mitts, under the end-result test, the formally separate steps of the transaction ...
that were employed to achieve Mr. Strangi's testamentary objectives should be collapsed
and viewed as a single integrated transaction: the transfer at Mr. Strangi's death of the
underlying assets.").
91 See 76-2 U.S. Tax Gas. (CC1-1) 1 13,155, at 85,695 (WM. Wis. 1976).
92 See id.
93 Id.
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ber 31, 1968 transaction as the transfer of a minority interest.”" On
the basis of this conclusion, the court viewed the two gifts as one and
held that the valuation discounts were not appropriate. In resolving
transfer tax controversies, other courts have followed Driver." But the
paucity of decisions following this model indicates that courts recog-
nize the danger of a "willy-nilly" use of this doctrine. Left unchecked,
the Service could be vested with the power to defeat many estate
plans.
III. ANALYSIS OF USING JUDICIAL DOCTRINES IN RESOLVING TRANSFER
TAX CONTROVERSIES
A survey of judicial doctrine use reveals that judicial doctrines are
not commonly used in resolving transfer tax controversies. Indeed,
only the fact-finding component of the substance over form doctrine
seems to have earned judicial acceptance.96 Use of the statutory con-
struction component of the substance over form doctrine and other
judicial doctrines have been subject to harsh criticisms from commen-
tators97 and often summarily dismissed by the courts." An analysis of
the Murphy and Church cases helps confirm why either an over or un-
der utilization of judicial.doctrines may prove problematic."
A. The Murphy Decision
Mrs. Murphy had married into wealth. As evidenced by the facts
of this case (albeit, simplified for purposes of this analysis), she
wanted to retain control of her wealth, at least as near to her death as
possible. Her husband had owned and operated the Evening Tele-
gram Company, a business that his father had started almost a century
earlier. Upon Mr. Murphy's demise and in the family tradition, Mrs.
Murphy continued to operate the business as company president.
94 Id. at 85,699.
" See, e.g., Blanchard v. United States, 291 F. Supp. 348, 348-50 (S.D. Iowa 1968)
(holding valuation discounts inappropriate when taxpayers made gifts to children and
three weeks later gifted property was sold); Estate of McMullen v. Comin'r, 56 T.C.M. ,
(CCH) 507 (1988) (denying minority discount for taxpayer's beneficial trust interest in
real estate where governing trust document required that real estate be sold as a single
parcel).
96 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
97 See, e.g.,Jerry A. Kasner, IRS Aignes Substance Over Form in Gift and Estate Tax Cases, 76
TAX NOTES 247 (1997).
See, e.g., Estate of Monroe v. Connie'', 124 F.3d 699, 714 (5th Cir. 1997).
" Compare Estate of Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 645 (1990), with Coniner v. Estate of
Church, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 60,369 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2000).
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During her tenure as company president, Mrs. Murphy began to
groom her two children to assume company control. She made no
secret that she wanted control and ownership of the company to re-
main in the Murphy name. 1430
To help her realize her goal, Mrs. Murphy periodically sought
professional advice. For example, soon after her husband's death,
Mrs. Murphy's tax advisor and certified public accountant recom-
mended that she decrease her company ownership from 65% to
about 51%. Mrs. Murphy followed this advice and made gifts of com-
pany stock in trust for the benefit of her two children and retained a
51.41% interest in the company. Over the next several years, Mrs.
Murphy's advisor repeatedly implored her to reduce her company
ownership to under 50%. By relinquishing her control position,
thereby becoming a minority  shareholder, Mrs. Murphy could
significantly reduce the value of company stock included in her gross
estate. Preliminary computations indicated that multi-million dollar
transfer tax savings could be achieved. Still, Mrs. Murphy was reluc-
tant to heed this advice. 101
But after being diagnosed with lung cancer and suffering from
obstructive pulmonary disease, Mrs. Murphy knew that death was
imminent. She therefore took the necessary steps to transfer company
ownership to her children. After serving as company president for
close to a decade, she named her son in her place and, in addition,
named her daughter as company vice-president. Also, Mrs. Murphy
finally followed the advice of her advisor and transferred a 0.88% in-
terest in the company to her son and another 0.88% interest in the
company to her daughter, thereby reducing her ownership in the
company below 50% to 49.65V°'
Eighteen days later, Mrs. Murphy died. On her gift tax return, the
executors of Mrs. Murphy's estate discounted the value of the com-
pany stock to reflect the fact that the gifted stock represented a mi-
nority interest in the company. Likewise, the same approach was taken
on Mrs. Murphy's estate tax return. Her executors discounted the
value of Mrs. Murphy's stock to reflect that it, too, represented a mi-
nority interest in the company (49.65%)."
The Service challenged the validity of these valuation discounts,
claiming that Mrs. Murphy's gifts of company stock days before her
lw See. Murphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 647.
101 Sec id. at 647-48.
102 See id. at 648.
10s Sec id. at 650-51.
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death constituted a mere device to circumvent her transfer tax obliga-
tions. In response, the executors of the taxpayer's estate contended
that the shares Mrs. Murphy gifted and those included in her gross
estate constituted, in each case, a minority interest and should be val-
ued accordingly. In a decision marked by a cautious yet unyielding
tone, the Tax Court held in favor of the Service. Recognizing that it
was voyaging into largely uncharted waters, the Tax Court resorted to
the use of all three judicial doctrines—the substance over form doc-
trine, the business purpose doctrine, and the step transaction doc-
trine—to help anchor its position. 104
Insofar as the substance over form doctrine was concerned, the
court pointed out that minority interest discounts are appropriate
only where a taxpayer relinquishes contro1. 105 In terms of corporate
governance, rights associated with control include (among others)
the privilege of electing board members, deciding compensation, and
handling general corporate policy concerns. 106 As a practical matter,
the court asserted, Mrs. Murphy remained in control before and after
the gifts were made. In fact, until her death Mrs. Murphy remained at
the company's helm as chairman of the board. The court therefore
concluded that "all concerned intended nothing of substance to
change between the time of transfer and the time of [Mrs. Murphy's]
death, and that nothing of substance did change." 107
Citing to Gregory and Knetsch, the court also made implicit refer-
ence to the business purpose doctrine. 108 In repeated passages
throughout the decision, the court declared that the sole objective in
giving the company shares was to avoid federal transfer taxes. 109 There
is no hint in the court's factual determinations that Mrs. Murphy
made these gifts as a means to augment her income or to ensure
business continuity. Finally, the court determined Mrs. Murphy's pur-
104 See id. at 656-66.
105 See Mtophy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 658.
06 Id. at 658-59.
107 Id. at 659.
1413 See supra notes 12 and 46 and accompanying text.
1 °9
 See Muiphy, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 645 ("Transfer of the gift fragments did not appre-
ciably affect the decedent's beneficial interest except to avoid Federal u-ansfer taxes on the
control premium."); id. at 648 (`The only purpose for the two gifts of 100 shares each was
the anticipated tax benefit."); id. at 651 ("Decedent's fragmentation of her control block
by gift of two .88 percent blocks to her children 18 days before her death did not substan-
tially affect her beneficial interest in the corporation. The only intended effect was to ob-
tain a minority discount for the control block."); id. at 658 ("A minority discount should
not be applied if the explicit purpose and effect of fragmenting the control block of stock
was solely to reduce Federal tax.").
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poseful fragmentation of company control in two steps really consti-
tuted a single testamentary transfer. Mrs. Murphy's gifts were catego-
rized as a mere ploy to reduce transfer tax valuations while maintain-
ing the company stock in the Murphy family name. Put differently,
"the transfer of control to decedent's children in two steps in sub-
stance [was] one transaction." 110 Having drawn this conclusion, the
court coalesced Mrs. Murphy's gifts and her bequest into one transfer
for purposes of valuing the company stock and thereby negated the
application of any minority discount.
B. The Church Decision
Like Mrs. Murphy, Mrs. Church, a widow, had property that she
wanted to leave to her two children. She was suffering from terminal
breast cancer and she, too, did not want to let fate take its course. On
October 22, 1993, Mrs. Church formed a limited partnership with her
children. A corporation was to serve as the general partner of the lim-
ited partnership and Mrs. Church and her two children were to serve
as its limited partners. That same day, Mrs. Church made (or at-
tempted to make) contributions to the limited partnership of a
$380,038 ranch and $1,087,710 of marketable securities she owned.
Two days after the purported establishment of the limited partner-
ship, however, Mrs. Church died suddenly as a result of cardiopul-
monary collapse."
On her estate tax return, her executors set forth the value of her
limited partnership interest to be $617,591, or less than one-half of
the value of the property Mrs. Church contributed to the limited
partnership. The estate justified the size of this steep discount based
on the facts that Mrs. Church's limited partnership interest did not
give her a voice in partnership governance matters and her limited
partnership interest was not marketable. 112
Positing that the limited partnership was a sham, the Service
claimed that the entire fair market value of all the assets Mrs. Murphy
contributed—or attempted to contribute—to the limited partnership
should be included in her gross estate. The Service cited several facts
to support its position: (1) the corporate general partner of the lim-
110 Id. at 662. The court further elaborated that "Et] he explicit plan was to transfer .88
percent of the stock to each of the children to make it appear that control had temporarily
disappeared. This had no intended effect or purpose other than the anticipated tax say-
ings." Id. at 663.
See Church, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) at 84,781.
112 See id. at 84,779-80.
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ited partnership was formed several Months after Mrs. Church's
death, (2) the establishment of the partnership coincided with a point
in time when Mrs. Church's cancer, although apparently in clinical
remission, had reoccurred and, due to undisclosed medical side ef-
fects, she could not be treated with chemotherapy, (3) close to 70% of
the underlying partnership property was comprised of passive assets
in the form of marketable securities rather than business property, (4)
the account holding the marketable securities was not changed into
the name of the limited partnership until several months until after
Mrs. Church's death, and (5) the certificate of limited partnership
denoted that it was executed on July 1, 1993—months before it admit-
tedly had been executed:113
These facts could have provided fertile grounds for the use of
judicial doctrines. Like Heyen, the court could have found, in sub-
stance, that the limited partnership was in an embryonic stage and
not yet worthy of recognition or that Mrs. Church had not effectuated
her intended partnership contributions prior to her death.'" Alterna-
tively, like Murphy, the court could have found that the establishment
of the limited partnership served no legitimate business purpose be-
cause the issue of•business continuity was never truly at stake." 15 Fi-
lially, like Driver, the court could have found that the establishment of
the limited partnership was a temporary stepping-stone to transfer
wealth to Mrs. Church's children. 116 Despite having these facts at its
disposal, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas de-
clined the Service's implicit invitation to use judicial doctrines to de-
feat the taxpayer's tax minimization strategy and held in favor of the
taxpayer.
The court either dismissed as irrelevant or, instead, ruled in the
taxpayer's favor with respect to virtually every fact the Service had
cited. More specifically, the court made the following factual deter-
minations: (1) under Texas law, the establishment of a limited part-
nership may precede the establishment of its corporate general part-
ner, (2) based upon the testimony of Mrs. Church's physician, the
cause of Mrs. Church's death was "largely unrelated" to her cancer,
(3) the limited partnership could use the marketable securities as a
source of working capital, (4) Mrs. Church had relinquished owner-
ship over the securities even though they remained in her personal
113 See id. at 84,780-82.
114
 Cf. 945 F.2(.1 at 361.
115 Cf. 60 T.C.M. (CCH) at 645.
116 Cf 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 13,155, at 85,699 (W.D. Wis. 1976).
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account, and finally, (5) the incorrect date on the limited partnership
certificate was attributed to a clerical error. Drawing upon these fac-
tual determinations, the court held that Mrs. Church, along with her
children, had formed a legitimate limited partnership for legitimate
business reasons." 7 The strength of these factual determinations
slammed the door on the use of judicial doctrines proffered by the
Service.
C. Analysis of the Church and Murphy Decisions
The similarities in the situations confronting the Murphy and
Church families are remarkable. For both Mrs. Murphy and Mrs.
Church, Death and the Taxman were each on the doorstep impa-
tiently waiting side-by-side. Each family knew that while Death's entry
was inevitable, the. Taxman's was not—at least, if proper steps were
taken. In what were likely last minute desperate acts, both families
attempted to capitalize on valuation discounts to minimize their re-
spective tax burdens. In Mrs. Murphy's case, the strategy failed; in
Mrs. Church's case, the strategy prevailed. There is no easy way to
reconcile the difference in outcomes. One might presume that one
court was right and the other wrong. Further analysis reveals, how-
ever, that both courts were wrong.
There is a sense that justice was done in the Murphy decision be-
cause the taxpayer was not able to defeat her transfer tax burden in
such a seemingly transparent manner. But upon closer examination, it
becomes clear that this sense of satisfaction is misplaced. The Code
and the regulations support the taxpayer's use of valuation dis-
counts. 118 Thus, judicial doctrines were the only weapon available to
the Service to defeat Mrs. Murphy's transfer tax minimization strategy.
As discussed in Section II, the use of judicial doctrines in the con-
text of transfer tax controversies has unique characteristics. More
specifically, only the fact-finding component of the substance over
117 See Church, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCII) at 84,781.
118 I.R.C. §§ 2031 (a), 2512(a); Treas.' Reg. § 25.2512-1. In analyzing the validity of
these discounts in the context of lima-family transfers, courts respect taxpayers' use of
valuation discounts and have repeatedly rejected the Service's quest to use family attribu-
tion rules in making valuation determinations. See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Connii'r,
839 F.2d 1249 (7th Cir. 1988); Propstra v. United States, 680 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1982);
Estate of Bright v. United States, 658 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1981); Estate of Andrews v.
Comm'r, 79 T.C. 938 (1982); Estate of Lee v. Conun't, 69 T.C. 860 (1978). In 1993, the
Service finally conceded that family attribution is not an appropriate rationale for denying
a minority discount, See Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B.
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form doctrine has earned legitimacy. In the Murphy case, Mrs. Murphy
did give a 0.88% interest in the company to each of her two children
and, upon her death, she held a 49.65% minority interest in the com-
pany. As a practical matter, once these gifts were made, Mrs. Murphy
could no longer unilaterally make corporate decisions without the
approval of at least one other shareholder who held a 0.35% or
greater stake in the company. This state of affairs admittedly lasted
only a very short period of dine, but the fact that it existed at all indi-
cates that Mrs. Murphy had forever changed her position in the coin-
pany. 119
 In the final analysis, it appears that the Tax Court was too
overzealous in its use of judicial doctrines.
By the same token, the district court in Church was incorrect in its
reluctance to use judicial doctrines. The facts of the Church case illus-
trate that Death greeted the taxpayer too quickly. Mrs. Church had no
time to put all her affairs in proper order and, for that matter, par-
ticipate in the limited partnership arrangement. The establishment of
the limited partnership was really a work in progress; it had not yet
resulted in a vital, functioning entity. More specifically, at the moment
of Mrs. Church's death, the limited partnership had no general part-
ner to operate it or any working capital at its disposal; it was more a
concept than a reality.
Although the business purpose and the step transaction doctrines
play marginal roles in resolving transfer tax controversies, the Church
court still could have resorted to the fact-finding component of the
substance over form doctrine to deny the taxpayer any valuation dis-
count. 12° The limited partnership was an inchoate estate planning de-
11° Even if the business purpose doctrine were relevant, Mrs. Murphy's objective in
snaking her stock gifts was no different than that of most other closely-held business own-
ers who want their children to continue to operate the family business. The Tax Court,
however, emphasized that Mrs. Murphy made gifts for reasons related to transfer tax
minimization. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. And the sky is blue: many tax-
payers make gifts for the identical reason (for example, a $10,000 cash gift to capitalize on
the annual gift tax exclusion) and no court attacks the validity of these transfers. The fact
Mrs. Murphy had also made the gift to ensure business continuity should have insulated
the legitimacy of her gifts front a business purpose doctrine challenge.
In its analysis, the Tax Court also made dubious reliance on the step transaction
doctrine. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. Thus far, this doctrine has played only
a marginal role in resolving transfer tax controversies and for good reason. The estate
planning process usually involves several steps. Taken at face value, liberal use of the step
transaction doctrine could have a Draconian chilling effect in area of estate planning. See
discussion supra Part 1I.C.
120
 The court possibly could have relied upon LRC. § 2036(a) to cause Mrs. Church's
purported capital contributions to the limited partnership to be included in her gross
estate. This section of the Code provides that if a taxpayer retains a direct or indirect in-
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vice that precedent indicates would have served her purposes well had
Mrs. Church survived. 121 Mrs. Church's untimely death, however,
should have negated its legitimacy. Instead, poofl Two days after sign-
ing her name to a piece of paper that had no legal effect over her as-
sets, several hundred thousand dollars of asset value were said to have
disappeared. 122 Given the strong piscatorial odor of the court's factual
determinations, something seems amiss in the court's reasoning and
• the conclusions the court reaches from these facts.
CONCLUSION
Had the courts in Murphy and Church properly surveyed the use
of judicial doctrines in transfer tax controversies, perhaps each would
have reached a different conclusion. This survey would have revealed
that, given the general tax avoidance nature of estate planning, the
use of judicial doctrines plays a limited, albeit sometimes vital, role in
transfer tax controversies. Only the substance over form doctrine has
relevance; its application, however, is limited to its analytical compo-
nent that probes what the taxpayer did and not the analytical compo-
nent that is used as a tool of statutory construction.
Taxpayers, the Service, the courts and Congress have lessons to
learn from this analysis and the outcomes reached in the Murphy and
Church decisions. In planning their estates, taxpayers are at liberty to
capitalize upon and exploit the literal language of the Code. This can
be done without fear that the words utilized constitute special tennis
of art. When it comes to making present interest gifts that qualify for
the annual exclusion, for example, a transfer passes muster if the
beneficiary has an immediate and direct right to gifted property.m
But if a taxpayer instead orchestrates the passage of wealth to A, using
B as a mere condUit, a court will view the transaction skeptically. It will
terest in property until death, the value of such property is included in the taxpayer's gross
estate. See Estate of Reichardt v. Counter, 114 T.C. 149,155 (2000) (finding that because of
an implied agreement that the taxpayer could continue to use assets she had contributed
to the limited partnership as her own, such assets were held includible in her gross estate);
Estate of Schauerhainer v. Conint'r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 2855 (1997).
151 See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
125 For an excellent exposition of this disappearing wealth phenomenon, see James
Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 Tax LAW REV. 915
(1995). For two recent expositions of how Congress should remedy valuation issues that
beset the transfer tax system, see Laura E. Cunningham, Remember the Alamo: The IRS Needs
Ammunition in Its Fight Against the FLP, 86 TAX NOTES 1461 (2000), and Leo L. Schmolka,
FLI's and GRATs: What to Do?, 86 Tax NOTES 1473 (2000).
123 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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pierce the taxpayer's machinations and analyze the facts of the trans-
action as they truly exist. 124
During the audit process, the Service should rely upon judicial
doctrines with great circumspection. Only when taxpayers are less
than forthright regarding the nature of their actions should the Serv-
ice's challenges predicated upon judicial doctrines meet with success.
Otherwise, the Service's reliance on these doctrines will be counter-
productive, belying a weakness in its position.
In analyzing transfer tax controversies, courts should follow the
model of its predecessors. More specifically, courts historically have
been reluctant to rely upon judicial doctrines to attack taxpayers' es-
tate plans. 125
 This is because the underpinnings of these doctrines—
save the component of the substance over form doctrine that makes
factual determinations—hold little relevance for resolving transfer tax
controversies.
Finally, there is a message in this analysis for Congress. Taxpayers
will continue to aggressively employ transfer tax minimization tech-
niques, particularly because the chilling effects of judicial doctrines
are virtually nonexistent in the estate planning arena. 126 This means
that Congress must be vigilant in drafting transfer tax statutes. 127
124 See, e.g., Heyen, 945 F.2d at 363.
123 See supra notes 111-121 and accompanying text.
126
 The popularity of tax avoidance in the area of estate planning cannot be under-
stated. For a classic article that surveys these techniques, see George Cooper, A Vohtntary
Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 CoLum. L. REv. 161 (1977).
127 The use of judicial doctrines often acts as a bellwether for legislative action. Recall,
for example, how Gregory required that a legitimate corporate reorganization have an un-
derlying business purpose. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. This amorphous
"business purpose" standard was thus made part of the common law of the then reorgani-
zation provisions. See generally Bittker, supra note 35; Michaelson, supra note 35. But Con-
gress generally recognizes that amorphous common-law standards are not good standards
for tax practice; therefore, after the Gregory decision was rendered, Congress incorporated
a more specific business purpose test into the Code. I.R.C. § 355(a) (1) (B). See Treas. Reg.
§ 1.355-2(b) CA corporate business purpose is a real and substantial non-Federal tax pur-
pose, germane to the business ...."); Herbert N. Beller, Business Purpose Under Section 333:
Mat Works and 117zat Doesn't, 58 TAX NorEs 1109 (1993); Mark .). Silverman et al., Ii9iat is a
Business Pu rpose Under the Section .335 Regs.?, 71 J. TAX'N 4 (1989).
The Gregory decision is not alone in this respect. There are many other cases where the
use of judicial doctrines served as a catalyst to propel Congress into action. For example,
in Helvering u Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 336 (1940), the Supreme Court held that, under cer-
tain circumstances, the Service could ignore the separate existence of a trust. After Clifford
was rendered, to reduce the tax uncertainties associated with trust formation, Congress
was subsequently obliged to introduce the so-called grantor trust rules under Subchapter J
of the Code. See generally Sherwin Rankin et al., The Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Trusts,
Estates, and Beneficiaries, 68 Harm L. REv. 1237, 1259-64 (1954).
20011	 Judicial Doctrines and Transfer Tax Controversies	 617
When a transfer tax minimization technique that is ostensibly sanc-
tioned under the Code arises, Congress cannot afford to wait for the
courts to stymie its use. Instead,. Congress must swiftly respond with
specific legislation to eliminate the technique in question: Failure to
close these loopholes will serve as an open invitation to taxpayers to
siphon transfer tax dollars from the federal coffer. 128
In the end, most courts—the gatekeepers of judicial doctrines—
understand that judicial doctrines will never be a substitute for well-
crafted legislation. Nowhere is this aphorism truer than with respect
to transfer taxes. But the use of judicial doctrines in the context of
resolving transfer tax controversies cannot be entirely discarded. As is
evident front the Murphy and Church decisions, courts must under-
stand the role these doctrines play in the transfer tax setting, lest they
risk rendering other miscarriages of justice.
128 For example, to minitnize their transfer taxes, taxpayers used to recapitalize their
corporations with common and preferred stock. They would then gift the common stock
at a greatly reduced value and retain the preferred stock. By participating in this exercise,
taxpayers would "freeze" the value of the preferred stock in their estates and potentially
save significant transfer taxes. Courts upheld the validity of these arrangements and the
discounts associated with the transfer of common stock. See Estate of Anderson v. C0111111 ' r,
56 T.C.M. (CCH) 553 (1988); Estate of Gilman v. Cormier, 65 T.C. 296 (1975). In reaction
to this ploy and to reduce the hemorrhage of federal transfer tax dollars then being lost,
Congress first enacted I.R.C. § 2036(c) to combat the perceived abuses of these estate
freeze recapitalizations used by taxpayers in circumventing their tratisfer tax obligations.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 10402(a), 101 Stat.
1330-431 (repealed 1990). Because I.R.C. § 2036(c) proved to be too cothplicated and
ineffectual, it was repealed and supplanted by Chapter 14 of the Code. Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 11602(a), 104 Stat. 1388,1388-491.
